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In a standard adverse selection world, asymmetric information about product quality leads to 
quality deterioration in the market. Suppose that a higher investment level makes the 
realization of high quality more likely. Then, if consumers observe the investment (but not the 
realization of product quality) before purchase, they can infer the probability distribution of 
high and low quality that may be put on the market. We uncover two effects that may lead the 
firm to overinvest in quality compared to a market with full information: first, an adverse 
selection effect according to which a sufficiently large investment can avoid adverse selection 
and, second, an efficiency effect according to which a larger investment reduces the 
probability of socially inefficient, low quality products in the market. 
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We examine the eﬀects of asymmetric information on a ﬁrm’s incentive to
invest in the quality of its product. Asymmetric information prevails because
consumers cannot ascertain the quality of the product before they buy it.
Asymmetric information may then lead to adverse selection because a ﬁrm
upon learning its type has the option to exit the market. Prior to learning its
quality, the ﬁrm decides on a risky investment: a higher investment increases
the probability that product quality is high. Consumers can observe the
investment level and thereby, obtain information about the expected quality
in the market. Using a simple model, we show that in such a situation, ﬁrms
might end up investing more in quality under asymmetric information than
under full information.
Inspired by previous work that alludes to the adverse selection problem
arising from an unmodeled investment in quality (see, e.g., Milgrom and
Roberts, 1986), we explicitly model that the level of the investment aﬀects
the probability distribution over quality and we provide two simple argu-
ments that support overinvestment in quality. First, if it is suﬃciently likely
that the ﬁrm’s quality is low, the expected willingness to pay of a consumer
is less than the marginal cost of high quality (which is larger than the cost of
low quality). In such a situation the high-quality ﬁrm would exit the market
so that there is adverse selection. At the investment stage, the ﬁrm foresees
this problem: it can overinvest compared to the full information benchmark
to avoid adverse selection – we call this eﬀect the adverse selection eﬀect.
Second, since a larger investment gives evidence of a probability distribution
with a higher probability of high quality, incentives to invest are stronger
under asymmetric information if low-quality production is socially ineﬃ-
cient, that is, if the unit cost of production exceeds the willingness-to-pay
for this unit. Overinvestment (relative to full information, where ineﬃcient
products are not oﬀered in the market) here serves to limit the probability of
socially ineﬃcient products being sold in the market – we call this eﬀect the
eﬃciency eﬀect. Each eﬀect on its own may lead to overinvestment under
asymmetric information relative to the full information benchmark (which,
in our benchmark model, implements the socially eﬃcient allocation).
1Key requisite for our result is the consumers’ ability to draw inferences
from investment levels on expected product quality. Consumers can be in-
formed about certain business practices and about the use of certain inputs.
Concerning business practices, the type of investment we have in mind can
be exempliﬁed by a ﬁrm’s eﬀort to meet standards for quality management
systems, such as ISO 9000. The ISO 9000 certiﬁcation does not guarantee
the quality of end products and services; rather, it certiﬁes that consistent
business processes are being applied. That is, it proves that the ﬁrm (actu-
ally, any type of organization) has put in place the necessary processes (i.e.,
a quality management system) “to fulﬁl the customer’s quality requirements,
and applicable regulatory requirements, while aiming to enhance customer
satisfaction, and achieve continual improvement of its performance in pur-
suit of these objectives.”1 Cole (1998, p. 68) conﬁrms our view by suggesting
that ﬁrms may make ISO 9000 “their primary instrument for signaling qual-
ity to their customers.”2 ISO 9000 thus enables a ﬁrm to convince consumers
that the probability of a failure is low; yet, it cannot exclude the possibil-
ity of a failure and thus applying ISO 9000 does not constitute a minimum
standard on product quality.
Also, pharmaceutical ﬁrms provide information about their input in re-
search and development for a particular prescription drug, apparently to
make prescribing doctors and hospital pharmacists think that their product
is likely to be successful (and thus justify high margins). In the cosmet-
ics industry, the leading company, L’Oréal, emphasizes in its advertisement
campaigns the large number of patents it ﬁles every year (over 500 in 2005)
and how much it invests in cosmetic and dermatological research (3% of sales
or $625 million in 2005), so as to convince consumers of its commitment to
1Taken from www.iso.org (ISO 9000. Understanding the basics).
2However, ﬁrms may also seek certiﬁcation simply in compliance with requirements of
major customers or regulators. To disentangle the relative importance of these two moti-
vations, Anderson et al. (1999) estimate a probit model of ISO 9000 certiﬁcation. They
show that the signaling motivation is indeed important: the desirability of communicating
quality outcomes to external parties provides incremental explanatory power for the cer-
tiﬁcation decision (even after including compliance motivations for seeking certiﬁcation).
Quality management systems seem thus to correspond to the type of investments we refer
to in our model.
2market high-quality products. Producers of wines, organic food and other
food products invest in production processes and inform consumers about
these investments with the idea that the adoption of such processes leads to
better products on average. This information is often transmitted by the use
of certain labels provided by producer organizations that guarantee speciﬁc
production processes and inputs.
Concerning information about inputs, we note that in various industries
products consist of a collection of inputs of uncertain quality. Let us take
a particularly simple view on how product quality is determined: suppose
consumers only care about price and the probability that the product is ex-
perienced to be of high quality; this probability is determined by the share of
high-quality inputs. According to this view, the investment decision refers to
the decision to which extent to procure high-quality components. Then by
advertising the brands of some of the inputs, the ﬁrm informs consumers that
the product’s overall performance is likely to be good.3 Examples abound:
equipment manufacturers use certiﬁed components (e.g. Leica lenses in opti-
cal equipment); bike manufacturers advertise the components produced e.g.
by Shimano; Hollywood studios hire well-liked actors partly with the idea
that these actors lead to better movies on average. Presuming that bet-
ter actors make it more likely that consumers enjoy the movie, our theory
suggests that studios overinvest in these well-liked actors when the adverse
selection eﬀect comes into play (even ignoring the competition at the box
oﬃce). We may even link our theory to the response of hiring decisions by
ﬁrms: a well-known CEO or CFO may be seen as a “branded” input that in-
creases the likelihood of good performance and thus improves the conditions
for external ﬁnancing.
While there is an abundant economic literature on quality in asymmetric
information situations, we are not aware of work that uncovers the adverse
selection and eﬃciency eﬀects described above. This literature starts with
Akerlof’s (1970) “lemons’ principle”, according to which adverse selection
(resulting from asymmetric information) causes the bad quality to drive the
good quality out of the market. Various ways have then been explored to
3According to this view, there is no signaling taking place. Signaling motives can be
an alternative reason for the use of certiﬁed inputs if they are complements to each other.
3remedy, or at least alleviate, the underprovision of quality that prevails un-
der asymmetric information. Warranties (see e.g. Grossman, 1981) and
repeat purchase (see e.g. Klein and Leﬄer, 1981) may lead to socially opti-
mal quality levels. Leland (1979) has explored the role of minimum quality
standards as a policy to cope with the underprovision of quality in a compet-
itive market. He also explores the incentives of a professional group to set
a minimum industry quality standard. Here, a socially excessive minimum
quality standard may result as a means to restrict supply and as a means to
increase demand by aﬀecting average quality. Note that Leland’s arguments
for excessive quality standards do not apply to our model.4
Signaling is another means by which ﬁrms may reduce the asymmetric
information and convince consumers of the good quality of their product.
Typically, in the signaling literature started by Spence (1973), an invest-
ment is non-productive but less costly for high-quality types. Spence shows
that the non-productive investment can be used as a signaling device.5 In
contrast with the signaling literature, the investment in our model is made
before the type is known.6 Here, the level of investment determines the
4De Meza and Webb (1987) obtain an overinvestment result of a diﬀerent sort. They
consider a competitive market in which entrepreneurs face an asymmetric information
problem when asking for outside ﬁnance. Entrepreneurs have to make the same level of
investment to enter the market but they diﬀer in the probability to be successful. De Meza
and Webb show that too many entrepreneurs invest. In their model, the overinvestment
result directly stems from the adverse selection framework that makes high-quality projects
draw in low-quality projects. In a related model, Lensink and Sterken (2001) also obtain an
overinvestment result, which, however, stems from the possibility to delay the investment
decision and not from the heterogeneity of expected returns of projects. Yet, in these
models more aggregate investment lowers average quality.
Levin (2001) considers diﬀerent qualities of seller information in an Akerlof model and
shows that the amount of trade and thus average quality are nonmonotone in the degree
of asymmetric information. See also Kessler (2001).
5Other potential signals are price and advertising; see, e.g., the seminal contributions by
Nelson (1974) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986). In a price-signaling context, Shieh (1993)
has analyzed the investment incentives in cost-reducing innovations under asymmetric
information, where neither the investment nor product quality is observable to consumers.
He shows that asymmetric information about quality may strengthen the ﬁrm’s incentive
to invest in cost-reducing innovation.
6In a signaling context, Daughety and Reinganum (1995) develop a monopoly model
in which R&D also aﬀects the probability distribution over types and ﬁnd that the ﬁrm
4probability distribution over types and thus directly provides information
to consumers. We obtain overinvestment under asymmetric information
compared to full information for the reasons explained above. These are
diﬀerent from the signaling argument.7
Creane (2007) considers a market in which an unlimited number of ho-
mogeneous ﬁrms decide whether to enter with uncertain quality. After entry,
ﬁrms observe the quality; high quality is more costly than low quality. The
number of ﬁrms, determined by the free entry condition according to which
high and low quality ﬁrms stay in the market, is not sustainable because
the participation constraint of high-quality ﬁrms is violated, and thus would
lead to adverse selection. Therefore ﬁrms enter in smaller number and ob-
tain positive equilibrium proﬁts under free entry. While Creane considers
entry for a given investment level, we analyze the situation for a given ﬁrm
in which the probability distribution over quality is continuously aﬀected by
the investment level.
As outlined above, our paper provides new insights on the interaction
between asymmetric information and investment. Our benchmark model
has been stripped down to highlight the basic eﬀects at work. As a down-
side, this does not allow us to address interesting policy questions. To this
end, we extend the analysis to markets in which the ﬁrm is not able to
extract the full expected surplus (as naturally arises in a bargaining con-
text, as analyzed in Subsection 4.2, or with downward sloping demand, as
analyzed in Subsection 4.3). In such markets, private and social incentives
to invest already diﬀer under full information. Our overinvestment result
then implies that asymmetric information with respect to realized quality
may improve welfare. Public policy interventions (such as consumer reports,
or government approval of product introductions) often try to alleviate the
asymmetric information problem consumers face about ﬁnal product qual-
ity. Our results show that such policies may be harmful to society as they
underinvests. While the ﬁrm can use price to signal quality, the R&D level is unobservable
to consumers and thus does not allow them to draw inferences, contrary to our setting.
7An advantage of our formulation relative to the signaling literature is that consumers
obtain direct information, so that we do not need to be concerned with out-of-equilibium
beliefs.
5may reduce investments.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the model and
we analyze the benchmark of full information. In Section 3, we develop the
asymmetric information case and we contrast it to the benchmark in order to
establish our main result (which we illustrate through a numerical example).
In Section 4, we provide a number of extensions: we reconsider the analy-
sis introducing outside options, partial rent extraction, and heterogeneous
consumers. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The model and full-information benchmark
2.1 The model
Suppose a single seller oﬀers a product to a unit mass of buyers. The seller’s
opportunity cost is cs, where s ∈ {L,H} is the quality of the product. High
quality is assumed to be more costly than low quality, cH > cL. There is a
unit mass of buyers who are assumed to be identical and have unit demand.
The valuation of each buyer is assumed to be rs. By deﬁnition, high quality
is more valuable than low quality, rH > rL. Denote I(λ) the investment that
is needed to obtain that with probability λ the product is of high quality.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that I(λ) = (k/2)λ2, which satisﬁes I′ > 0, I′′ > 0,
and limλ→0 I′(λ) = 0.
We consider the following three-stage game: at stage 1, the ﬁrm invests I
in quality; at stage 2, after learning the quality realization it sets its price; at
stage 3, buyers form beliefs about product quality and make their purchasing
decision. As stated in the introduction, I(λ) can be interpreted as eﬀorts
to meet standards for quality management systems, or as a commitment to
meet on average a certain reliability or quality of the product. This is an
upfront investment in the “design” of the product which does not aﬀect the
marginal cost.8 After quality has been realized, a ﬁrm with the ability to
produce a certain quality level has to use variable inputs for production.
8Arguably, incorporating branded inputs into the product also aﬀects marginal cost.
In our speciﬁcation, we stress the ﬁxed-cost part of the contractual arrangement between
input provider and ﬁrm. Our theory generalizes to variable costs that not only depend on
the realization of quality but also on λ.
6These inputs are more costly for high than for low quality.9
As we will explore below, under full information the ﬁrm chooses a
strictly positive investment level if rH − cH > rL − cL and zero investment
if the reverse inequality holds. Note that in our setting, the full-information
solution implements the ﬁrst best allocation (this is due to the fact that the
ﬁrm fully extracts all surplus); thus, deviations from the ﬁrst best are the
result of asymmetric information.
If the quality choice and the underlying investment decision cannot be
observed by consumers, the ﬁrm has no means to convince consumers that its
product is of high quality; the ﬁrm will therefore invest zero. This conﬁrms
that in markets in which ﬁrms choose quality, ﬁrms tend to provide too low
a quality from a social point of view.
What we investigate is whether a risky investment in quality, where the
investment is observable to consumers, results in the same type of quality
trap as before. Clearly, the situation we envisage now potentially allows
consumers to obtain information about the expected quality in the market,
since consumers observe the investment eﬀort and have a clear understanding
of the relationship between investment spending and expected quality. We
restrict attention to equilibria in which the ﬁrm extracts all rents so that
price is equal to expected surplus.10
To simplify the exposition, and with minimum loss of generality, we make
the following set of assumptions:
(A1) rH > cH,
(A2) rH − cH > rL − cL,
(A3) cH > rL.
According to assumption (A1), the high quality is socially beneﬁcial. We
make no such assumption for the low quality; rather, we want to contrast
9Here, a moral hazard problem may arise according to which a high-ability producer
deviates to low quality. We deal with this issue in the extension section.
10In a modiﬁed model in which the number of consumers exceeds the number of available
units and in which consumers bid for the product, equilibrium price is necessarily equal
to expected surplus (see e.g. Tadelis, 1999).
7the cases where the low quality is either socially beneﬁcial (rL > cL) or not
(rL < cL). What assumption (A2) simply says is that the high quality is
socially more beneﬁcial than the low quality (which is trivially satisﬁed when
the low quality is not socially beneﬁcial). Finally, according to assumption
(A3), the cost of the high quality is larger than the consumers’ valuation of
the low quality.11
2.2 Full information benchmark
We ﬁrst analyze the full information case, in which consumers observe the
investment and the realization of quality. We distinguish between two cases.
In what is referred to below as case (1), low quality is socially beneﬁcial (rL ≥
cL) and is therefore put on the market under full information. Otherwise,
if rL < cL, referred to as case (2), low quality is not socially beneﬁcial and
hence, not produced under full information.
Low quality is socially beneﬁcial. When rL ≥ cL, the ﬁrm’s maximiza-
tion problem is maxλ Eπ1 = λ(rH−cH)+(1−λ)(rL−cL)−(k/2)λ2. Solving
the ﬁrst-order condition of proﬁt maximization, we obtain as the probability
for high-quality: (rH −cH −rL +cL)/k, which is positive under assumption
(A2). Note that we have an interior solution if k > rH −cH −rL +cL (oth-
erwise the probability is 1). We also check that the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt
evaluated at λ = (rH − cH − rL + cL)/k is positive:
Eπ1|λ=(rH−cH−rL+cL)/k = 1
2k (rH − cH − rL + cL)
2 + (rL − cL) > 0 (1)






k [(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)] if k > rH − cH − rL + cL ≡ k0,
1 if k ≤ k0.
(2)
Low quality is not socially beneﬁcial. When it is assumed instead
that rL < cL, the ﬁrm’s problem is maxλ Eπ2 = λ(rH − cH) − (k/2)λ2,
11Assumption (A3) is a technical assumption that allows us to rule out a case of little
interest. The three assumptions are clearly compatible when the low quality is not socially
beneﬁcial (rL < cL). Otherwise, assumptions (A2) and (A3) are compatible as long as
rL < (rH + cL)/2.
8which yields the following proﬁt-maximizing probability for high-quality:
(rH − cH)/k, which is positive under assumption (A1). Note that we have
an interior solution as long as k > rH − cH (otherwise the probability is 1)
and that the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt evaluated at λ = (rH −cH)/k is positive.
We can then deﬁne the probability for high quality under full information






k(rH − cH) if k > rH − cH ≡ k1,
1 if k ≤ k1.
(3)
3 Asymmetric information
In this section we analyze the situation of asymmetric information, in which
consumers observe I but not the realization of quality. We analyze perfect
Bayesian equilibria of the game in which the ﬁrm observes quality after
stage 1 and consumers only observe the investment level (and price) but not
the realized quality. We treat separately the same two cases as in the full
information benchmark: (1) rL ≥ cL and (2) rL < cL.
3.1 Low quality is socially beneﬁcial
We start by considering the case with rL ≥ cL. Suppose ﬁrst that consumers
expect any quality realization to be put on the market (clearly, if high quality
is put on the market, so is low quality since its costs are lower). The expected
surplus is thus λrH +(1−λ)rL, which is the price the ﬁrm will set at stage
2. Hence, expected proﬁts at stage 1 are
λ[λrH + (1 − λ)rL − cH] + (1 − λ)[λrH + (1 − λ)rL − cL] − (k/2)λ2
= λ(rH − cH) + (1 − λ)(rL − cL) − (k/2)λ2.
Solving the ﬁrst-order condition of proﬁt maximization, we obtain as the
probability for high-quality:
λa ≡ 1
k (rH − cH − rL + cL). (4)
We found the same value under full information. So, we already know that
λa < 1 provided that k > k0 and, from expression (1), that the ﬁrm’s
expected proﬁt evaluated at λ = λa is positive when rL ≥ cL.
9Comparing expression (4) with expression (2), we observe that, when
consumers expect both qualities to be put on the market, the probability
for high-quality is the same under asymmetric information and under full
information (λa = λ
f
1), meaning that investment incentives are not aﬀected
by consumer information if low quality is socially beneﬁcial.
However, the previous conclusion only holds when a high quality product
does actually stay in the market under asymmetric information. For this
to be true, the ﬁrm must be interested in oﬀering high quality. While it is
always willing to do so under full information (under our assumption that
rH > cH), it might prefer to stay out of the market under asymmetric
information. In other words, the ﬁrm faces an adverse selection problem.
For a high-quality ﬁrm to make positive operating proﬁts, the price must
exceed costs, i.e. λrH + (1 − λ)rL − cH ≥ 0, which is equivalent to




Hence, the ﬁrm will indeed implement λa if λa ≥ ￿ λ, which can be rewritten
as
λa ≥ ￿ λ ⇔ k ≤
rH − rL
cH − rL
(rH − cH − rL + cL) ≡ k2,
which is strictly positive (as well as ￿ λ) under assumption (A3). If k > k2 and
the ﬁrm implemented λa, consumers would know that a high-quality ﬁrm
would not participate, so that their beliefs about product quality would not
be conﬁrmed. Consumers expect a suﬃciently high probability that the
product is of low-quality, which reduces their willingness to pay. Hence, the
ﬁrm cannot charge a suﬃciently high price to cover its cost in case it is of
high quality. In such a case (i.e., λa < ￿ λ or k > k2), the ﬁrm has the option
to increase its investment expenditure, so as to increase the probability of
high quality up to ￿ λ.
In such a situation, overinvestment under asymmetric information is
driven by, what we call, the adverse selection eﬀect, as the overinvestment
avoids adverse selection. The condition for this option to be proﬁtable is
the following. As rL > cL, the ﬁrm may alternatively invest zero and oﬀer
low quality on the market. The former action is more proﬁtable than the
latter if ￿ λ(rH −cH)+(1−￿ λ)(rL −cL)−(k/2)￿ λ
2
> rL −cL or, equivalently,
10￿ λ[(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)] − (k/2)￿ λ
2
> 0. Solving for k we must have k <




[(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)] = 2k2.
As k2 > k0 follows from assumption (A1), we now have a complete picture
of the probability of high quality under asymmetric information in case (1).
We compare it to the full information solution in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 When low quality is socially beneﬁcial, the adverse selection ef-
fect drives the ﬁrm to overinvest in quality (λa
1 > λ
f
1) for intermediate values
of the investment cost (k2 < k ≤ 2k2). For small values of the investment
cost (k2 < k ≤ 2k2), investment incentives are not aﬀected by consumer in-
formation (λa
1 = min{λa,1} = λ
f
1), while for large values of the investment
cost (k > 2k2), the ﬁrm underinvests in quality (λa
1 = 0 < λ
f
1).
3.2 Low quality is not socially beneﬁcial
We consider now the case with rL < cL (meaning that under full information,
low quality would not be put on the market). We start again by supposing
that consumers expect any quality realization to be put on the market. As in
the previous case, the probability for high-quality that maximizes the ﬁrm’s
expected proﬁts at stage 1 is λa for k ≤ k0, or 1 otherwise. The diﬀerence
with the previous case is that the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt evaluated at λ = λa
might now be negative as rL − cL < 0. Therefore, in the present case, the
ﬁrm is better oﬀ when it enters the market than when it is not active as
long as λa(rH − cH) + (1 − λa)(rL − cL) − (k/2)(λa)
2 > 0, or
k <




It is easily checked that rL < cL implies that k1 < k0 < k3.
Comparing expression (4) with expression (3), we observe now that,
when consumers expect both qualities to be put on the market, investment
incentives are stronger under asymmetric information than under full infor-
mation: λa > λ
f
2. Here, low-quality products are not released on the market
under full information, but low quality is always consumed under asym-
metric information. Since this expected lower quality is reﬂected in price
11and since low quality is produced at costs above the consumers’ willingness
to pay, the ﬁrm has an incentive to reduce the probability of low quality
products through higher investments.
When low quality is not socially beneﬁcial, there is thus an additional
reason for ﬁrms to overinvest in quality. Overinvestment is driven by what
we call the eﬃciency eﬀect, as the ﬁrms attempt to make the probability
of low quality realizations smaller under asymmetric information to avoid
their ineﬃcient release on the market. It is only when the investment cost is
very high (i.e., k > k3) that the ﬁrm prefers not to invest under asymmetric
information while it keeps on investing under full information.
We still need to assess the adverse selection eﬀect. We have indeed
assumed so far that a high quality product stays in the market under asym-
metric information. But what happens if the ﬁrm is not willing to oﬀer high
quality on the market? As we have shown above, a high-quality ﬁrm does
not make positive operating proﬁts when λ < ￿ λ. Hence, consumers’ beliefs
about both qualities being oﬀered are not conﬁrmed if λa < ￿ λ or k > k2.
As in the previous case, the adverse selection eﬀect might then drive the
ﬁrm to overinvest in quality (i.e., to choose ￿ λ instead of λa). What changes
in the present case is the condition for this overinvestment to be proﬁtable.
Here, the alternative for the ﬁrm is to invest zero and stay altogether out
of the market (whereas, in case (1), the ﬁrm could still produce the socially
beneﬁcial low quality). Hence, with rL < cL, overinvestment is proﬁtable if
￿ λ(rH − cH) + (1 − ￿ λ)(rL − cL) − (k/2)￿ λ
2
> 0, which is equivalent to
k <
2(rH − rL)(cH − cL)(rH − cH)
(cH − rL)
2 ≡ k4.
Hence, overinvestment to avoid adverse selection occurs as long as k is com-
prised between k2 and k4. This is only possible if k4 > k2, or equivalently
if
cL < rL + ∆, with ∆ ≡
(cH − rL)(rH − cH)
(2rH − rL − cH)
> 0,
i.e., if the cost of the low quality is not too large (though it is larger, in case
(2), than the valuation of the low quality).
We thus need to distinguish between two sub-cases. In case (2a), cL <
rL + ∆ and there exist values of the investment cost for which the adverse
12selection eﬀect leads the ﬁrm to overinvest (k2 < k < k4). Moreover, a few
lines of computation establish that





We can therefore summarize the situation in case (2b) as in the following
table (where λa
2 denotes the probability of high quality under asymmetric
information in case (2)).
k ≤ k1 λa
2 = λ
f
2 = 1 no eﬀect of information
k1 < k ≤ k2 λa
2 = min{λa,1} > λ
f
2 overinvestment (eﬃciency)
k2 < k ≤ k4 λa




k > k4 λa
2 = 0 < λ
f
2 underinvestment
In contrast, in case (2b), cL ≥ rL + ∆ and the ﬁrm never overinvests
in quality to avoid the adverse selection eﬀect (as k4 ≤ k2). Then, the
comparison between the asymmetric and the full information solutions is as
follows.
k ≤ k1 λa
2 = λ
f
2 = 1 no eﬀect of information
k1 < k ≤ k3 λa
2 = min{λa,1} > λ
f
2 overinvestment (eﬃciency)
k > k3 λa
2 = 0 < λ
f
2 underinvestment
We collect the results about the two sub-cases in the next lemma.
Lemma 2 When low quality is not socially beneﬁcial, overinvestment may
occur because of the eﬃciency eﬀect only (if cL ≥ rL + ∆ and k1 < k ≤ k3,
or if cL < rL + ∆ and k1 < k ≤ k2) or because of a combination of the
eﬃciency and the adverse selection eﬀects (if cL < rL+∆ and k2 < k ≤ k4).
Otherwise, for low values of the investment cost, investment incentives are
not aﬀected by consumer information (λa
2 = λ
f
2), while for large values of
the investment cost, the ﬁrm underinvests in quality (λa
2 = 0 < λ
f
2).
3.3 Summary and illustration
Proposition 1 collects the results of Lemmata 1 and 2.
13Proposition 1 If consumers observe investments in the quality of products
but not the quality itself, a ﬁrm invests strictly more in quality under asym-
metric information than under full information, provided that (1) rL ≥ cL
and k2 < k ≤ 2k2 or (2a) rL < cL < rL + ∆ and k1 < k ≤ k4, or (2b)
rL + ∆ ≤ cL and k1 < k ≤ k3. In case (1) overinvestment is due to the
adverse selection eﬀect; in case (2a), it is due to the eﬃciency eﬀect or to a
combination of the two eﬀects; in case (2b), it is due to the eﬃciency eﬀect
only.
The three situations of over-investment are depicted in Figure 1. To
get the intuition behind our result, let us restate the argument. First, we
have seen that ignoring the participation constraint of the high-quality ﬁrm,
investment incentives weakly increase under asymmetric information com-
pared to full information. The reason for the potential overinvestment is
that a low-quality ﬁrm stays in the market under asymmetric information
even though its value is less than the cost because it is sold at the expected
and not the actual value. The fact that the product may be of low quality
is taken into account by consumers and thus reﬂected in the price. There-
fore, by investing more, the ﬁrm can convince consumers that the risk of
obtaining low quality is reduced. This is the eﬃciency eﬀect.
Secondly, taking into account the participation constraint of a high-
quality ﬁrm, investments under given beliefs may be insuﬃcient to make
selling high quality worthwhile. This implies that λa cannot be the equilib-
rium belief at the investment level I(λa). To make the participation of the
high-quality ﬁrm worthwhile, the ﬁrm has to distort its investment upward
in order to convince consumers that a high-quality outcome is more likely,
in which case they are willing to pay more. Thirdly, at the investment stage
the ﬁrm has to compare proﬁts with such an upward distorted investment
to the outside option (which is either zero or to sell low quality). It may be
proﬁtable to overinvest. This is the adverse selection eﬀect.
Finally, it is only when investments are too costly (i.e. k > 2k2 for
rL > cL or k > k3 or k4 for rL < cL) that the standard underinvestment
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Figure 1: Overinvestment under asymmetric information
A numerical example (which gives parameter values to all parameters
except k) illustrates our results for cases (1) and (2a). Take rH = 10,
cH = 6, and cL = 2. We take two values for rL: either rL = 3 > cL (case
(1)) or rL = 1 < cL (case (2a)). Consider ﬁrst case (1) with rL = 3. Under
full information, the ﬁrm would choose its investment such that λ
f
1 = 3/k.
As we have seen above, under asymmetric information and provided that
consumers expect that products are sold on the market independent of the
realization of the random variable, the ﬁrm would invest such that λa = λ
f
1.
However, for a high-quality ﬁrm to make positive operating proﬁts the price
must exceed costs, i.e. λrH+(1−λ)rL−cH ≥ 0, which becomes λ ≥ ￿ λ ≡ 3/7
under our parameter values. Hence, the ﬁrm will indeed implement λa if
λa ≥ ￿ λ. Otherwise, if the ﬁrm implemented λa, consumers’ beliefs about
product quality would not be conﬁrmed. The ﬁrm can then increase its
investment expenditure to increase the probability of high quality. Expected
quality is higher than under full information if ￿ λ = 3/7 > 3/k = λ
f
1, which
is equivalent to k > k2 = 7. To be an equilibrium strategy also at the
investment stage, expected proﬁts must be greater than rL − cL = 1, i.e.
154λ + (1 − λ) − (k/2)λ2 ≥ 1. Evaluated at ￿ λ = 3/7, this is equivalent to
k ≤ 2k2 = 14. Hence, for parameter values k ∈ (7,14] the ﬁrm invests
strictly more under asymmetric than under full information.
Suppose now that rL = 1, so that we are in case (2a). We check that
cL −rL = 1 < ∆ = 20/13, so that k3 > k2. Under full information, the ﬁrm
would choose its investment such that λ
f
2 = 4/k. Hence, k1 = 4. Redoing the
computations under asymmetric information, we ﬁnd that k0 = 5, k2 = 9,
k4 ≃ 11.5 and k3 = 12.5. Take, e.g., k = 10 and compute the various
thresholds on λ:12
￿ λ = 5





Hence, for parameter values k ∈ (4,11.5] the ﬁrm invests strictly more
under asymmetric information than under full information. For an interme-
diate range of investment cost levels (k ∈ (9,11.5)) the ﬁrm has to further
increase its investment in order to convince consumers that a high-quality
product will be put on the market. Only if investment costs are too high
(k > 11.5), investment under asymmetric information breaks down to zero
and is therefore less than under full information. Figure 2 illustrates our
results in case (2a), where rL < cL.13
In the exposition above we chose a quadratic investment cost function
merely to provide a simple explicit characterization. Focussing on the ad-
verse selection eﬀect, we show that the overinvestment result may obtain for
any strictly convex investment cost function I(λ) with I′(λ) > 0, I′′(λ) > 0,
I′(0) = 0, . Here, to obtain interior solutions, we impose the boundary
conditions limλ→1I′(λ) = ∞.
Under full information, and assuming that the low quality is socially
beneﬁcial, we obtain
λf = I′−1
[(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)].
12We have checked that expected proﬁts at stage 1 under ￿ λ are positive (namely, ￿ λ(rH −
cH) + (1 − ￿ λ)(rL − cL) − (k/2)￿ λ
2
= 19/81).
13Although the ﬁrm invests more under asymmetric information, it can easily be checked
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Figure 2: Investment in quality in case (2a)
Under asymmetric information, a ﬁrm ignoring the participation con-
straint would choose the same level of investment that is implied by λf,
i.e., λa = I′−1
[(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)]. Now, taking the participation con-
straint into account, λa is the ﬁrm’s actual choice as long as the price
exceeds costs, i.e. λrH + (1 − λ)rL − cH ≥ 0, which is equivalent to
λ ≥ ￿ λ = (cH − rL)/(rH − rL). Hence, the ﬁrm will indeed implement
λa if λa ≥ ￿ λ, or
I′−1




Otherwise, the ﬁrm may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to increase its investment up
to I(￿ λ). This is so if ￿ λ(rH − cH) + (1 − ￿ λ)(rL − cL) − I(￿ λ) > rL − cL
or, equivalently, ￿ λ[(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)] − I(￿ λ) > 0. Deﬁne the average
investment cost J(λ) ≡ I(λ)/λ. We must have [(rH−cH)−(rL−cL)]−J(￿ λ) >
0. Denote ￿ ￿ λ as the solution to [(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)] − J(λ) = 0, i.e. ￿ ￿ λ =
J−1[(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)]. If ￿ λ < ￿ ￿ λ, overinvestment in order to avoid
adverse selection is proﬁtable. To summarize, we must have
I′−1
[(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)] <
cH − rL
rH − rL
< J−1[(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)].
Fix D ≡ (rH − cH) − (rL − cL). By the strict convexity of I, we have
that I′−1
(D) < J−1(D). Hence, if the parameters are such that the ratio
(cH − rL)/(rH − rL) lies in some appropriately deﬁned intermediate range,
then overinvestment occurs because of the adverse selection eﬀect.
174 Extensions
In this section, we test the robustness of our results by extending the previ-
ous analysis into several directions.14 We ﬁrst introduce outside options in
order to solve the moral hazard problem. We show that the adverse selec-
tion and the eﬃciency eﬀects are still at play under this alternative setting.
Second, we assume that the seller can only partially extract the rent. Third,
we assume that consumers have heterogeneous valuations for quality. In the
latter two extensions, we focus on the adverse selection eﬀect and we show
that there exist situations where this eﬀect drives the ﬁrm to invest more in
quality under asymmetric than under full information.
4.1 The analysis with outside options
Our analysis can be criticized for the fact that under asymmetric informa-
tion, high quality is less proﬁtable than low quality since both are sold at
the same price, while low quality is cheaper to produce. If a successful in-
vestment enables the ﬁrm not only to produce high but also low quality, the
ﬁrm will always deviate to low quality due to the moral hazard problem.
This in turn would imply that a ﬁrm does not have any incentive to invest
under high quality because a higher investment does not contain information
about the expected product quality that will be put on the market. How-
ever, if the production cost of high and low quality is the same whereas high
and low quality give diﬀerent values for an outside option, a high quality
ﬁrm does not have an incentive to deviate to low quality (provided that its
production costs do not increase in quality).15 We show that our qualitative
14To keep the exposition simple, we use (and sometimes slightly abuse) the notation we
introduced in the previous section.
15For an analysis of quality increasing outside options in a signaling context, see Daugh-
ety and Reinganum (2005). We can also think of the outside option as a costly action
taken by the ﬁrm; in particular, it may use the services of a third-party certifyer, who
certiﬁes realized product quality (for an analysis of fully revealing third-party certiﬁcation,
see Biglaiser, 1993; for the use of third-party certiﬁcation as an alternative option within
a price signaling context, see Daughety and Reinganum, 2007). If this action fully reveals
its product quality, the ﬁrm can sell high quality under full information at a price rH. For
instance, if t is the cost of certiﬁcation then vH = rH − t and vL = rL − t are the values
of the outside option.
18ﬁndings from above are conﬁrmed.
Let vH and vL denote the value of the outside option for high and low
quality, respectively, while c denotes the production cost which is indepen-
dent of quality. By the nature of the problem, rH > vH > rL > vL. In
addition, we assume that the value of the outside option for high quality ex-
ceeds production costs, vH > c. We can then replicate the analysis of Section





k(rH − c) if rL < c,
1
k (rH − rL) if rL ≥ c,
and we deﬁne ˆ k0 ≡ rH −c. Next, we turn to the analysis under asymmetric
information and consider ﬁrst the case rL ≥ c. In analogy to Section 3, we
obtain that ˆ λ
a
= (1/k)(rH − rL) and ￿ ˜ λ = (vH − rL)/(rH − rL), where the
latter expression comes from the condition that the price λrH + (1 − λ)rL
has to exceed the value of the outside option for a high-quality product vH.
We then can calculate the critical value of k above which overinvestment
with ￿ ˜ λ > ˆ λ
a





For an investment I(λ) with λ ≤ ˆ λ
a
to be worthwhile, we must have that
the proﬁt is non-negative for rL < c. We obtain that this is the case for all





which is always greater than ˆ k0. Hence, the non-negativity condition is not
binding for all k ≤ ˆ k2 if ˆ k3 > ˆ k2. This is equivalent to vH + rL > 2c.
Consider now k > k2. For rL > c, an upward distortion of the invest-
ment gives greater proﬁt than oﬀering low quality in the market at zero
investment, i.e. λrH +(1−λ)rL −c−(k/2)λ2 > rL −c, as long as k < 2ˆ k2.
Overinvestment results then from the adverse selection eﬀect.
For rL ≤ c, an upward distortion of the investment gives greater proﬁt
than being inactive with zero investment, i.e. λrH+(1−λ)rL−c−(k/2)λ2 >
190, as long as k < ˆ k4 where16






Here, it is a combination of the eﬃciency and the adverse selection eﬀects
that drives the overinvestment.
We can summarize our analysis as follows.
Proposition 2 Suppose that a successful investment allows the ﬁrm to choose
between high and low quality, which are produced at equal cost, but that high
quality has a higher value than an outside option. If consumers observe
investments in the quality of products but not quality itself, a ﬁrm invests
strictly more in quality under asymmetric information than under full in-
formation, provided that (1) rL > c and ˆ k2 < k ≤ ˆ k4, or (2) rL < c and




. In case (1) overinvestment is due to the adverse
selection eﬀect; in case (2), it is due to the to a combination of the eﬃciency
and the adverse selection eﬀects.
4.2 Partial surplus extraction
In this extension, we depart from the initial framework by assuming that
the ﬁrm can only extract a share α (with 0 < α < 1) of the surplus. We
focus here on the case where the low quality is socially beneﬁcial (rL ≥ cL);
hence, if overinvestment occurs, it can only be due to the adverse selection
eﬀect.
We start with the full information benchmark. The ﬁrm’s maximization
problem in stage 1 is maxλ Eπ = λα(rH −cH)+(1−λ)α(rL−cL)−(k/2)λ2.
Solving the ﬁrst-order condition of proﬁt maximization, we obtain as the
probability for high-quality: α(rH − cH − rL + cL)/k. For low values of k,
this probability is larger than one. Hence, the probability for high quality




k [(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)] if k > α[rH − cH − rL + cL] ≡ k0(α),
1 if k ≤ k0 (α).
16The inequality can be rewritten as 2[λ(rH − rL) + rL − c]/λ
2 > k. To obtain ˆ k4, we
substitute the expression for ￿ ˜ λ. Clearly, ˆ k4 > ˆ k3 is equivalent to (vH + rL)/2 > c because
in this case proﬁts at ˆ λ
a
are strictly positive, so that an upward distortion that solves the
adverse selection problem is worthwhile.
20Consider now the asymmetric information case. Suppose ﬁrst that con-
sumers expect any quality realization to be put on the market. Buyers pay
the price that implements the surplus sharing rule α. Hence, they pay their
expected willingness to pay λrH +(1−λ)rL minus their share (1 − α) of the
total surplus λ(rH − cH) + (1 − λ)(rL − cL). That is, the payment is given
by
λrH + (1 − λ)rL − (1 − α)[λ(rH − cH) + (1 − λ)(rL − cL)]
= α[λrH + (1 − λ)rL] + (1 − α)[λcH + (1 − λ)cL].
The expected seller surplus is thus α[λ(rH − cH) + (1 − λ)(rL − cL)].
Hence, expected proﬁts at stage 1 are
α[λ(rH − cH) + (1 − λ)(rL − cL)] − (k/2)λ2.
Solving the ﬁrst-order condition of proﬁt maximization, we obtain as the
probability for high-quality:
λa (α) ≡ α
k [(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)].
We know from our previous analysis that λa (α) is the actual ﬁrm’s choice
as long as it allows the ﬁrm to make positive operating proﬁts. That is, the
payment must exceed costs cH, i.e., α[λrH +(1−λ)rL]+(1−α)[λcH +(1−
λ)cL] − cH ≥ 0, which is equivalent to
λ ≥ ￿ λ(α) ≡
cH − αrL − (1 − α)cL
α(rH − rL) + (1 − α)(cH − cL)
.
Therefore, the ﬁrm will indeed implement λa if λa (α) ≥ ￿ λ(α), which can
be rewritten as
k ≤
α(rH − rL) + (1 − α)(cH − cL)
cH − αrL − (1 − α)cL
α(rH − cH − rL + cL) ≡ k2 (α).
If k > k2 (α), then the ﬁrm has the option to increase its investment expendi-
ture, so as to increase the probability of high quality up to ￿ λ(α). This option
must yield larger proﬁts than investing zero and oﬀering only the low quality.
That is, α[￿ λ(α)(rH −cH)+(1−￿ λ(α))(rL−cL)]−(k/2)￿ λ(α)
2 > α(rL−cL)
21or, equivalently, α￿ λ(α)[(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)] − (k/2)￿ λ(α)
2 > 0. Solving
for k we must have k < 2α[(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)]/￿ λ(α), which is
k < 2
α(rH − rL) + (1 − α)(cH − cL)
cH − αrL − (1 − α)cL
α(rH − cH − rL + cL) = 2k2 (α).
We ﬁnally check that rH > cH implies that k2 (α) > k0 (α). We there-
fore observe that the results we obtained in the previous section with full
rent extraction carry over to the case of partial rent extraction. Indeed,
overinvestment is observed for k2 (α) < k ≤ 2k2 (α): for such values of the
investment cost, the ﬁrm chooses ￿ λ(α), which is above the full information
level.
The only noteworthy diﬀerence to our previous analysis is that the in-
vestment under full information is insuﬃcient from a social point of view
because the seller can only appropriate part of the surplus. Thus, the
presence of asymmetric information may alleviate the social underinvest-
ment problem. Indeed, the expected total net surplus is given by S (λ) =
λ(rH − cH)+(1 − λ)(rL − cL)−(k/2)λ2. We know from our previous analy-
sis that S (λ) reaches a maximum at λ = (1/k)[(rH − cH) − (rL − cL)],
which is equal to what we refer to as λf (1) in the present subsection. We
have also computed above that ￿ λ(α) < λf (1) for k < k2 (1). Therefore, for
k2 (α) < k ≤ min{2k2 (α),k2 (1)}, the ﬁrm invests more under asymmetric
information than under full information, and this overinvestment expands
the expected total net surplus (as k < k2 (1) implies that we are in the
increasing section of S (λ)).17
4.3 Heterogeneous consumers
We suppose now that consumers share the same valuation rL = 0 but diﬀer
in their valuation for high quality rH. The cumulative distribution function
over rH is denoted by F : R+ → [0,1]. We assume that F is continuous
on R+ and has a density f that takes values f(r) > 0 and is continuously
17It is easily seen that 2k2 (α) < k2 (1) is equivalent to α < 1/2. Hence, if the ﬁrm
appropriates less than half of the surplus, then the overinvestment due to the adverse
selection eﬀect is always welfare improving. On the other hand, if α > 1/2 and k2 (1) <











22diﬀerentiable for all r ∈ (r,r), where r ∈ R+ ∪ {∞}, and f(r) = 0 for
all r / ∈ [r,r]. Note that we allow for f(r) and f(r) to be zero or strictly
positive. We assume that the inverse hazard rate h( ) ≡ (1 − F( ))/f( )
is nonincreasing in r and h(r) = 0 if r is ﬁnite. The monotone hazard
rate assumption is satisﬁed if and only if 1−F is log-concave; this property
holds for a variety of parametric distribution functions (see e.g. Bagnoli and
Bergstrom, 2005). To focus on the adverse selection eﬀect, we set cL = 0.
In contrast with our initial framework, we assume here that the ﬁrm is
able to commit to its price at the investment stage.18 The timing of the game
is thus now as follows: in stage 1, the ﬁrm chooses λ and p, and in stage 2,
consumers learn λ and p, form beliefs about product quality according to λ,
and make their purchasing decision.
Under symmetric information, the ﬁrm solves maxp,λ πf(p,λ) − I(λ)
where πf = λ[1 − F(p)](p − cH), and I(λ) is such that I′ > 0, I′′ > 0,
I′(0) = 0 and limλ→1 I′(λ) = ∞. Consider ﬁrst the pricing decision. Note
that the proﬁt-maximizing price is independent of the investment decision.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to p is
[1 − F(p)] − f(p)(p − cH) = 0 ⇔ p = cH + h(p). (5)
By the monotone hazard rate assumption, the right-hand side is nonincreas-
ing. Furthermore, the right-hand side evaluated at cH is strictly greater
than cH. In addition, evaluated in the limit as p → r, it is strictly less than
r because it turns to cH for pf → r if r is ﬁnite and it is bounded from above
by some ﬁnite number if r is inﬁnite. Hence, pf is uniquely determined by
the solution to (5). The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to λ is simply
found as [1 − F(p)](p − cH) = I′(λ). Since the left-hand side is constant in
18Price commitment in our context means that product features and price are deter-
mined and advertised before actual quality is realized. Instead of price commitment, we
may equivalently assume that the ﬁrm makes a capacity commitment before actual quality
is realized and that consumers bid for the products. The adverse selection eﬀect comes
into play very naturally in this context. Indeed, it is the expected marginal cost that is
relevant for the price (or capacity) decision. Hence, ignoring adverse selection, the proﬁt-
maximizing price may be less than cH. In contrast, without price commitment, the ﬁrm
would optimally set its price above cH if λr > cH. Hence, only for ﬁnite r and suﬃciently
steep investment costs would the adverse selection eﬀect come into play.
23λ and the right-hand side increasing with I′(0) = 0 and limλ→1 I′(λ) = ∞,
there exists a unique solution λf to this problem:
λf = I′−1 ￿






where the second line uses expression (5) and the fact that [1 − F( )] =
f( )h( ).
At stage 2, under asymmetric information, a consumer of type rH ob-
serves λ and p, and buys the product if λrH − p ≥ 0. Hence, all consumers
with rH ≥ p/λ buy, so that expected demand for the product is 1−F(p/λ).




[1 − F(p/λ)](p − λcH) − I(λ).
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to p is
[1 − F(p/λ)] −
1
λ
f(p/λ)(p − λcH) = 0 ⇔ pa = λcH + λh(pa/λ). (7)
Using the same arguments as for pf, we know that pa is uniquely determined
by the solution to (7). It is also easily seen that pa increases with λ. The
ﬁrst-order condition with respect to λ is
p




λ2(p − λcH) − cHh(p/λ)
￿
= I′ (λ).
Replacing p by its optimal value pa in the latter expression and using ex-
pression (7), we obtain19





As we have seen above, three conditions must be fulﬁlled for the adverse
selection eﬀect to entail overinvestment in quality. First, the participation
constraint must be binding. This is so if pa < cH holds, which is equivalent
(as pa is an increasing function of λ) to λa being below some threshold ˜ λ.
19We have checked that the second-order conditions for a maximum in p and λ are
satisﬁed.
24The alternative strategy for the ﬁrm is then to invest I(˜ λ) instead of I(λa),
and concomitantly, to set p = cH instead of p = pa. The expected proﬁt is
then equal to [1−F(cH/˜ λ)](1−˜ λ)cH −I(˜ λ) and the second condition is that
this proﬁt be positive. Finally, if the two ﬁrst conditions are met, we can
talk of overinvestment with respect to the full information case if ˜ λ > λf.
We now take a speciﬁc example to illustrate that our overinvestment
result is preserved in this generalized setting. Suppose that F follows the
well-known exponential distribution F(r) = 1−e−r/  with r ∈ [0,∞) which
has density f(r) = (1/ )e−r/  and a constant inverse hazard rate, h(r) =  .
Setting this value into expressions (5) and (7), we ﬁnd that pf = cH +  and
pa = λ(cH + ) = λpf. So, ignoring the participation constraint, asymmetric
information simply entails a rescaling of the price with respect to the full
information case. Moreover, it is clear from expressions (6) and (8) that
pa/λ = pf implies that λa = λf. To ﬁnd the exact value of this probability,
we take the same investment cost function as in our initial setting: I (λ) =
(k/2)λ2. (This function does not satisfy limλ→1 I′(λ) = ∞ but works well
nevertheless.) Hence, I′ (λ) = kλ and I′−1
(λ) = λ/k. As f(pf)h(pf)2 =
(1/ )e−pf/  ×  2, we have
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≡ ˜ λ.
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µ(cH+ ) ≡ k2.
The alternative for the ﬁrm is to choose λ = ˜ λ and p = cH. The expected
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≥ 0 ⇐⇒ k ≤ 2




µ(cH+ ) = 2k2.
25As ˜ λ > λa = λf, we conclude that for k2 < k ≤ 2k2, the ﬁrm overinvests
relative to the full information case to avoid adverse selection.
As in Subsection 4.2, the ﬁrm’s overinvestment may improve welfare with
respect to the full information case. In our example, the indiﬀerent consumer
has the same identity under full and under asymmetric information: pf =
pa/λa = cH +  . The expected total net surplus is thus given by the same




(r − cH) 1
 e
− r
 dr = 2 e
− 1
µ(cH+ ).
The function S (λ) increases up to λ = K/k and decreases afterward. Hence,
as ˜ λ > λf, a suﬃcient condition for S(˜ λ) > S
￿
λf￿
is ˜ λ < K/k, which is
equivalent to
k <







Hence, for k2 < k ≤ 2k2 asymmetric information entails a welfare-improving
increase in investment relative to the full information case.
5 Conclusion
We have provided a simple model that shows that asymmetric information
about product quality may increase the incentives to provide higher quality
due to what we have coined the adverse selection and the eﬃciency eﬀect.
Our result obtains in situations where ﬁrms have the possibility to make a
risky and observable investment to increase the average quality (reliability)
of their products. An example of such investments could be the eﬀort to
obtain the ISO 9000 certiﬁcation for the ﬁrm’s quality management system.
Although consumers do not observe the realization of quality, they observe
how much the ﬁrm has invested and, thereby, infer useful information about
the expected quality on the market. Knowing this, a ﬁrm producing high
quality may overinvest in the quality or reliability of its product to convince
consumers that high quality is indeed very likely to be put on the market;
this avoids the lemons problem. Also, if selling low quality has a negative
social value, the ﬁrm may want to reduce the probability of low quality
realization compared to the full-information world, because under full infor-
26mation low quality would not be put on the market, whereas in an adverse
selection environment low quality is always oﬀered.
We have thus identiﬁed two simple reasons for overinvestment in quality
under asymmetric information. We analyzed in detail a particularly simple
model that provides explicit solutions; however, the logic of our argument
applies more generally. As we have shown in the extension section, our
arguments remain valid (i) if we introduce a moral hazard problem after
the investment stage and introduce quality-dependent outside options, (ii)
if consumers have some bargaining power so that the ﬁrm cannot extract the
full surplus, and (iii) if consumers have heterogeneous valuations for high-
quality products so that the resulting demand curve is downward sloping.
Our overinvestment result is relative to the full information case. As we have
illustrated in extensions (ii) and (iii), if the investment under full information
is less than the welfare optimum, public policy that removes the asymmetric
information problem may be welfare-decreasing.
An interesting extension is to embed our model into a setting with diﬀer-
ent ﬁrm types so that the issue of signaling arises. One such setting would
be to allow for a share of informed consumers (who directly observe prod-
uct quality, e.g., by reading consumer reports) and a share of consumers
who only observe the investment level. Suppose there are two types of
ﬁrms, which diﬀer by their technology to convert investments in success
probability. Focussing on separating equilibria, we expect that for a set of
parameters, equilibria exist in which a ﬁrm of the less eﬃcient type does
not invest (because of adverse selection) whereas more eﬃcient ﬁrms over-
invest. In this case, our adverse selection eﬀect comes again into play: the
ﬁrm has to invest a suﬃcient amount in order to convince consumers that
high-quality ﬁrms stay in the market. Due to the presence of informed con-
sumers, a ﬁrm with a less eﬃcient technology does not have an incentive
to mimic the ﬁrm with a more eﬃcient technology. Hence, the investment
level contains additional information because of its signaling role: consumers
correctly learn the type of the ﬁrm through the investment level. Signaling
here is costless in the sense that the ﬁrm chooses the same investment level
independent of whether consumers observe the ﬁrm’s type. This suggests
that our arguments are also relevant in signaling environments.
27Another interesting extension concerns information disclosure. In our
model, the ﬁrm fully discloses its information at the investment stage so
that consumers learn expected quality. Our investment cost function in-
cludes any advertising costs that are needed for full disclosure (at the in-
vestment stage) because otherwise, the investment is of no value to the ﬁrm
in our benchmark model. Our overinvestment results therefore critically
rely on the ﬁrm’s ability to use directly informative advertising to truthfully
communicate information to consumers. This suggests that laws against de-
ceptive advertising can stimulate investment incentives. However, ﬁrms may
not be able to communicate realized quality to consumers. In the language
of the economics literature on advertising, consumers learn their expected
match value but remain uncertain until after purchase about their realized
match value.20 Future work may want to take a closer look at the interaction
of investment and advertising decision under asymmetric information.
20On advertising as information about match value, see Meurer and Stahl (1994) and
Anderson and Renault (2006).
28References
[1] Akerlof, George (1970), The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncer-
tainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics
84, 488—500.
[2] Anderson, Simon P. and Régis Renault (2006), Advertising Content,
American Economic Review 96, 93-113.
[3] Anderson, Shannon W., J. Daniel Daly and Marilyn F. Johnson (1999),
Why Firms Seek ISO 9000 Certiﬁcation: Regulatory Compliance or
Competitive Advantage? Production and Operations Management 8,
28—43.
[4] Bagnoli, Mark. and Ted Bergstrom (2005), Log-Concave Probability
and its Applications, Economic Theory 26, 445-469.
[5] Biglaiser, Gary (1993), Middlemen as Experts, Rand Journal of Eco-
nomics 24, 212—223.
[6] Cole, Robert E. (1998), Learning from the Quality Movement: What
Did and What Didn’t Happen? California Management Review 41,
43—73.
[7] Creane, Anthony (2007), Investment and Latent Adverse Selection,
mimeo.
[8] de Meza, David and David C. Webb (1987), Too Much Investment: A
Problem of Asymmetric Information, Quarterly Journal of Economics
102, 281—292.
[9] Daughety, Andrew and Jennifer Reinganum (1995), Product Safety:
Liability, R&D, and Signaling, American Economic Review 85, 1187-
1206.
[10] Daughety, Andrew and Jennifer Reinganum (2005), Secrecy and Safety,
American Economic Review 95, 1074-1091.
[11] Daughety, Andrew and Jennifer Reinganum (2007), Communicating
Quality: A Uniﬁed Model of Disclosure and Signaling, mimeo.
29[12] Grossman, Sanford J. (1981), The Information Role of Warranties and
Private Disclosure about Product Quality, Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics 24, 461—83.
[13] Kessler, Anke (2001), Revisiting the Lemons Market, International Eco-
nomic Review 42, 25-41.
[14] Klein, Benjamin and Keith Leﬄer (1981), The Role of Market Forces
in Assuring Contractual Performance, Journal of Political Economy 89,
615-641.
[15] Leland, Hayne E. (1979), Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of
Minimum Quality Standards, Journal of Political Economy 87, 1328—
1346.
[16] Lensink, Robert and Elmer Sterken (2001), Asymmetric Information,
Option to Wait to Invest and the Optimal Level of Investment, Journal
of Public Economics 79, 365—374.
[17] Levin, Jonathan (2001), Information and the Market for Lemons, Rand
Journal of Economics 32, 657-666.
[18] Meurer, Michael J. and Stahl, Dale O., II. (1994), Informative Adver-
tising and Product Match, International Journal of Industrial Organi-
zation 12, 1—19.
[19] Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1986), Price and Advertising Signals
of Product Quality, Journal of Political Economy 94, 796—821.
[20] Nelson, Philip (1974), Advertising as Information, Journal of Political
Economy 82, 729—54.
[21] Shieh, Shiou (1993), Incentives for Cost-Reducing Investment in a Sig-
nalling Model of Product Quality, Rand Journal of Economics 24, 466—
477.
[22] Spence, Michael (1973), Job Market Signaling, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 87, 355—374.
30[23] Tadelis, Steven (1999), What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable
Asset, American Economic Review 89, 548—563.
31CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2557 Christian Keuschnigg, Corporate Taxation and the Welfare State, February 2009 
 
2558 Marcel Gérard, Hubert Jayet and Sonia Paty, Tax Interactions among Belgian 
Municipalities: Does Language Matter?, February 2009 
 
2559 António Afonso and Christophe Rault, Budgetary and External Imbalances 
Relationship: A Panel Data Diagnostic, February 2009 
 
2560 Stefan Krasa and Mattias Polborn, Political Competition between Differentiated 
Candidates, February 2009 
 
2561 Carsten Hefeker, Taxation, Corruption and the Exchange Rate Regime, February 2009 
 
2562 Jiahua Che and Gerald Willmann, The Economics of a Multilateral Investment 
Agreement, February 2009 
 
2563 Scott Alan Carson, Demographic, Residential, and Socioeconomic Effects on the 
Distribution of 19
th Century US White Statures, February 2009 
 
2564 Philipp Harms, Oliver Lorz and Dieter Urban, Offshoring along the Production Chain, 
February 2009 
 
2565 Patricia Apps, Ngo Van Long and Ray Rees, Optimal Piecewise Linear Income 
Taxation, February 2009 
 
2566 John Whalley and Shunming Zhang, On the Arbitrariness of Consumption, February 
2009 
 
2567 Marie-Louise Leroux, Endogenous Differential Mortality, Non-Contractible Effort and 
Non Linear Taxation, March 2009 
 
2568 Joanna Bęza-Bojanowska and Ronald MacDonald, The Behavioural Zloty/Euro 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate, March 2009 
 
2569 Bart Cockx and Matteo Picchio, Are Short-Lived Jobs Stepping Stones to Long-Lasting 
Jobs?, March 2009 
 
2570 David Card, Jochen Kluve and Andrea Weber, Active Labor Market Policy Evaluations: 
A Meta-analysis, March 2009 
 
2571 Frederick van der Ploeg and Anthony J. Venables, Harnessing Windfall Revenues: 
Optimal Policies for Resource-Rich Developing Economies, March 2009 
 
2572 Ondřej Schneider, Reforming Pensions in Europe: Economic Fundamentals and 
Political Factors, March 2009  
2573 Jo Thori Lind, Karl Ove Moene and Fredrik Willumsen, Opium for the Masses? 
Conflict-Induced Narcotics Production in Afghanistan, March 2009 
 
2574 Silvia Marchesi, Laura Sabani and Axel Dreher, Agency and Communication in IMF 
Conditional Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence, March 2009 
 
2575 Carlo Altavilla and Matteo Ciccarelli, The Effects of Monetary Policy on 
Unemployment Dynamics under Model Uncertainty - Evidence from the US and the 
Euro Area, March 2009 
 
2576 Falko Fecht, Kjell G. Nyborg and Jörg Rocholl, The Price of Liquidity: Bank 
Characteristics and Market Conditions, March 2009 
 
2577 Giorgio Bellettini and Filippo Taddei, Real Estate Prices and the Importance of Bequest 
Taxation, March 2009 
 
2578 Annette Bergemann and Regina T. Riphahn, Female Labor Supply and Parental Leave 
Benefits – The Causal Effect of Paying Higher Transfers for a Shorter Period of Time, 
March 2009 
 
2579 Thomas Eichner and Rüdiger Pethig, EU-Type Carbon Emissions Trade and the 
Distributional Impact of Overlapping Emissions Taxes, March 2009 
 
2580 Antonios Antypas, Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Nikolaos Kourogenis and Nikitas Pittis, 
Selectivity, Market Timing and the Morningstar Star-Rating System, March 2009 
 
2581 António Afonso and Christophe Rault, Bootstrap Panel Granger-Causality between 
Government Budget and External Deficits for the EU, March 2009 
 
2582 Bernd Süssmuth, Malte Heyne and Wolfgang Maennig, Induced Civic Pride and 
Integration, March 2009 
 
2583 Martin Peitz and Markus Reisinger, Indirect Taxation in Vertical Oligopoly, March 
2009 
 
2584 Petra M. Geraats, Trends in Monetary Policy Transparency, March 2009 
 
2585 Johannes Abeler, Armin Falk, Lorenz Götte and David Huffman, Reference Points and 
Effort Provision, March 2009 
 
2586 Wolfram F. Richter, Taxing Education in Ramsey’s Tradition, March 2009 
 
2587 Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn and Eiji Fujii, China’s Current Account and 
Exchange Rate, March 2009 
 
2588 Alexander Haupt and Silke Uebelmesser, Voting on Labour-Market Integration and 
Education Policy when Citizens Differ in Mobility and Ability, March 2009 
 
2589 Hans Jarle Kind, Marko Koethenbuerger and Guttorm Schjelderup, Should Utility-
Reducing Media Advertising be Taxed?, March 2009  
2590 Alessandro Cigno, How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System 
Design, March 2009 
 
2591 Helmut Lütkepohl and Fang Xu, The Role of the Log Transformation in Forecasting 
Economic Variables, March 2009 
 
2592 Rainald Borck, Hyun-Ju Koh and Michael Pflüger, Inefficient Lock-in and Subsidy 
Competition, March 2009 
 
2593 Paolo M. Panteghini, On the Equivalence between Labor and Consumption Taxation, 
March 2009 
 
2594 Bruno S. Frey, Economists in the PITS?, March 2009 
 
2595 Natalie Chen and Dennis Novy, International Trade Integration: A Disaggregated 
Approach, March 2009 
 
2596 Frédérique Bec and Christian Gollier, Term Structure and Cyclicity of Value-at-Risk: 
Consequences for the Solvency Capital Requirement, March 2009 
 
2597 Carsten Eckel, International Trade and Retailing, March 2009 
 
2598 Gianni De Nicolò and Iryna Ivaschenko, Global Liquidity, Risk Premiums and Growth 
Opportunities, March 2009 
 
2599 Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach, International Antitrust Enforcement and Multi-Market 
Contact, March 2009 
 
2600 Massimo Bordignon and Guido Tabellini, Moderating Political Extremism: Single 
Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule, April 2009 
 
2601 Ana B. Ania and Andreas Wagener, The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an 
Evolutionary Learning Process, April 2009 
 
2602 Simon Gächter, Daniele Nosenzo, Elke Renner and Martin Sefton, Sequential versus 
Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence, April 2009 
 
2603 Philippe Jehiel and Andrew Lilico, Smoking Today and Stopping Tomorrow: A Limited 
Foresight Perspective, April 2009 
 
2604 Andreas Knabe, Steffen Rätzel, Ronnie Schöb and Joachim Weimann, Dissatisfied with 
Life, but Having a Good Day: Time-Use and Well-Being of the Unemployed, April 
2009 
 
2605 David Bartolini and Raffaella Santolini, Fiscal Rules and the Opportunistic Behaviour 
of the Incumbent Politician: Evidence from Italian Municipalities, April 2009 
 
2606 Erkki Koskela and Jan König, Can Profit Sharing Lower Flexible Outsourcing? A Note, 
April 2009 
  
2607 Michel Beine, Frédéric Docquier and Çağlar Özden, Diasporas, April 2009 
 
2608 Gerd Ronning and Hans Schneeweiss, Panel Regression with Random Noise, April 
2009 
 
2609 Adam S. Booij, Bernard M.S. van Praag and Gijs van de Kuilen, A Parametric Analysis 
of Prospect Theory’s Functionals for the General Population, April 2009 
 
2610 Jeffrey R. Brown, Julia Lynn Coronado and Don Fullerton, Is Social Security Part of the 
Social Safety Net?, April 2009 
 
2611 Ali Bayar and Bram Smeets, Economic, Political and Institutional Determinants of 
Budget Deficits in the European Union, April 2009 
 
2612 Balázs Égert, The Impact of Monetary and Commodity Fundamentals, Macro News and 
Central Bank Communication on the Exchange Rate: Evidence from South Africa, April 
2009 
 
2613 Michael Melvin, Christian Saborowski, Michael Sager and Mark P. Taylor, Bank of 
England Interest Rate Announcements and the Foreign Exchange Market, April 2009 
 
2614 Marie-Louise Leroux, Pierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthiere, Should we Subsidize 
Longevity?, April 2009 
 
2615 Ronald MacDonald, Lukas Menkhoff and Rafael R. Rebitzky, Exchange Rate 
Forecasters’ Performance: Evidence of Skill?, April 2009 
 
2616 Frederick van der Ploeg and Steven Poelhekke, The Volatility Curse: Revisiting the 
Paradox of Plenty, April 2009 
 
2617 Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, Hannes Öhler and Johannes Weisser, Acting 
Autonomously or Mimicking the State and Peers? A Panel Tobit Analysis of Financial 
Dependence and Aid Allocation by Swiss NGOs, April 2009 
 
2618 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Roman Matousek and Chris Stewart, Rating Assignments: 
Lessons from International Banks, April 2009 
 
2619 Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz, Asymmetric Information and Overinvestment in 
Quality, April 2009 